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Abstract. The goal of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework in order to analyze coop-
erative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed to form. We will axiomatize the structure
of such allowable coalitions using the theory of antimatroids, a notion developed for combinatorially
abstract sets. There have been previous models developed to confront the problem of unallowable
coalitions. Games restricted by a communication graph were introduced by Myerson and Owen.
We introduce a new combinatorial structure called augmenting system, which is a generalization of
the antimatroid structure and the system of connected subgraphs of a graph. The main result of
the paper is a direct formula of Shapley and Banzhaf values for games under augmenting systems
restrictions.
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1. Introduction. Cooperative games under combinatorial restrictions are coop-
erative games in which the players have restricted communication possibilities, which
are defined by a combinatorial structure. The first model in which the restrictions are
defined by the connected subgraphs of a graph is introduced by Myerson [11]. Since
then, many other situations where players have communication restrictions have been
studied in cooperative game theory. Contributions on graph-restricted games include
Owen [12], Borm, Owen, and Tijs [3], and Hamiache [8]. In these models the pos-
sibilities of coalition formation are determined by the positions of the players in a
communication graph. Another type of combinatorial structure introduced by Gilles,
Owen, and van den Brink [7] is equivalent to a subclass of antimatroids. This line
of research focuses on the possibilities of coalition formation determined by the posi-
tions of the players in the so-called permission structure. Sandholm et al. [14] analyze
coalition formation in combinatorial problems.
In the present paper, we use the restricted cooperation model derived from a
combinatorial structure called augmenting system. Section 2 introduces this structure,
which is a generalization of the antimatroid structure and the system of connected
subgraphs of a graph. Furthermore, this new set system includes the conjunctive
and disjunctive systems derived from a permission structure. Section 3 introduces
games under augmenting systems which generalize the ones studied on graphs and
permission structures. Using the structural properties from these systems we will be
able to express the dividends in terms of the original game. This result will be essential
in section 4 to provide direct formulas to compute the Shapley and Banzhaf values
for games under augmenting systems restrictions. In these formulas, these values are
computed by means of the original game without having to calculate the restricted
game and taking into account only the coalitions in the augmenting system. Finally,
in section 5 we consider the potential and the Owen multilinear extension (MLE) for
the restricted game. These results generalize, unify and simplify results of Owen [12],
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Gilles, Owen, and van den Brink [7], and Bilbao [2].
2. Augmenting systems. Antimatroids were introduced by Dilworth [5] as
particular examples of semimodular lattices. Since then, several authors have obtained
the same concept by abstracting various combinatorial situations (see Korte, Lovász,
and Schrader [10]). In this section, a general cooperation structure is introduced,
which is a weakening of the antimatroid structure.
Let N be a finite set. A set system over N is a pair (N,F) where F ⊆ 2N is a
family of subsets. The sets belonging to F are called feasible. We will write S ∪ i and
S \ i instead of S ∪ {i} and S \ {i}, respectively.
Definition 2.1. A set system (N,A) is an antimatroid if
A1. ∅ ∈ A,
A2. for S, T ∈ A, we have S ∪ T ∈ A,
A3. for S ∈ A with S 
= ∅, there exists i ∈ S such that S \ i ∈ A.
The definition of antimatroid implies the following augmentation property : If
S, T ∈ A with |T | > |S| , then there exists i ∈ T \ S such that S ∪ i ∈ A. We call a
set system (N,F) normal if N = ⋃S∈F S. If (N,A) is a normal antimatroid, then
property A2 implies that N ∈ A.
Definition 2.2. An augmenting system is a normal set system (N,F) with the
following properties:
P1. ∅ ∈ F ,
P2. for S, T ∈ F with S ∩ T 
= ∅, we have S ∪ T ∈ F ,
P3. for S, T ∈ F with S ⊂ T, there exists i ∈ T \ S such that S ∪ i ∈ F .
Remark. It follows from the definition that normal antimatroids are always aug-
menting systems.
Proposition 2.3. An augmenting system (N,F) is an antimatroid if and only
if F is closed under union.
Proof. The necessary condition follows from A2. Conversely, we only have to
prove A3. Let S ∈ F with S 
= ∅. By property P3 there exists a chain of feasible
subsets
∅ = S0 ⊂ S1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Ss−1 ⊂ Ss = S
such that Sk ∈ F and |Sk| = k for 0 ≤ k ≤ s. Hence there exists an element i ∈ S
such that S \ i = Ss−1 ∈ F .
Example. The following collections of subsets of N = {1, . . . , n}, given by F = 2N
and F = {∅, {1}, . . . , {n}} , are the maximum augmenting system and a minimal
augmenting system over N , respectively.
Example. In a communication graph G = (N,E) , the set system (N,F) given by
F = {S ⊆ N : (S,E(S)) is a connected subgraph of G} is an augmenting system.
Example. Gilles, Owen, and van den Brink [7] showed that the feasible coali-
tions system (N,F) derived from the conjunctive or disjunctive approach contains
the empty set and the ground set N and that it is closed under union. Algaba et
al. [1] showed that the coalitions systems derived from the conjunctive and disjunc-
tive approach were identified to poset antimatroids and antimatroids with the path
property, respectively. Thus, these coalitions systems are augmenting systems.
Convex geometries are a combinatorial abstraction of convex sets introduced by
Edelman and Jamison [6].
Definition 2.4. A set system (N,G) is a convex geometry if it satisfies the
following properties:
C1. ∅ ∈ G,
124 JESÚS MARIO BILBAO
C2. for S, T ∈ G, we have S ∩ T ∈ G,
C3. for S ∈ G with S 
= N , there exists i ∈ N \ S such that S ∪ i ∈ G.
Proposition 2.5. An augmenting system (N,F) is a convex geometry if and
only if F is closed under intersection and N ∈ F .
Proof. The necessary conditions follow from properties C2 and C3. To prove
sufficiency, note that (N,F) satisfies C1 and C2, i.e., it is a closure system over N .
Moreover, (N,F) satisfies property P3 and N ∈ F . Then for every S ∈ F with
S 
= N , there exists i ∈ N \ S such that S ∪ i ∈ F .
Definition 2.6. Let (N,F) be an augmenting system. For a feasible coalition
S ∈ F , we define the set S∗ = {i ∈ N \ S : S ∪ i ∈ F} of augmentations of S and the
set S+ = S ∪ S∗ = {i ∈ N : S ∪ i ∈ F} .
Proposition 2.7. Let (N,F) be an augmenting system. Then the interval
[S, S+]F = {C ∈ F : S ⊆ C ⊆ S+} is a Boolean algebra for every nonempty S ∈ F .
Proof. It is suffices to show that [S, S+]F = {C ⊆ N : S ⊆ C ⊆ S+}, i.e., for
every C ⊆ N such that S ⊆ C ⊆ S+ we have C ∈ F . If S∗ = ∅, then [S, S+]F = {S} .
Otherwise, S∗ = {i1, . . . , ip} and S ⊆ C ⊆ S+ implies C = S ∪ {i1, . . . , iq} for some
1 ≤ q ≤ p.We prove that C ∈ F by induction on q. For q = 1 we know that S∪{i1} ∈
F . Assume S ∪ {i1, . . . , ik} ∈ F . Since S ∪ {ik+1} ∈ F and (S ∪ {i1, . . . , ik}) ∩
(S ∪ {ik+1}) = S 
= ∅, property P2 yields S ∪ {i1, . . . , ik, ik+1} ∈ F .
Let (N,F) be a set system and let S ⊆ N be a subset. A feasible subset C ∈ F
with C ⊆ S is called a basis of S if C∪ i /∈ F for all i ∈ S \C. The maximal nonempty
feasible subsets of S are called components of S. Clearly, every component of S is a
basis of S. However, the converse is not true, as the following example shows.
Example. If N = {1, 2, 3} and F = {∅, {1} , {2} , {2, 3} , N} , then C = {1} is a
basis of N , but the only component of N is the ground set N.
Observe that if (N,A) is an antimatroid, then any subset S ⊆ N has a unique
basis given by the following operator int(S) =
⋃ {C ∈ A : C ⊆ S} . This feasible set
is also the unique component of S.
Proposition 2.8. Let (N,F) be an augmenting system and let S ⊆ N be a
subset. Then a nonempty feasible subset C ⊆ S is a basis of S if and only if C is a
component of S.
Proof. Let C ∈ F be a basis of S and suppose C is not a component of S,
i.e., there exists D ∈ F such that C ⊂ D ⊆ S. Then because of P3 there exists
i ∈ D \ C ⊆ S \ C such that C ∪ i ∈ F , which is a contradiction.
We denote by CF (S) the set of the components of a subset S ⊆ N . Observe that
the set CF (S) may be the empty set. This set will play a role in the concept of a
game restricted by an augmenting system.
Proposition 2.9. A set system (N,F) satisfies property P2 if and only if for
any S ⊆ N with CF (S) 
= ∅, the components of S form a partition of a subset of S.
Proof. We suppose that (N,F) satisfies P2 and let S1, S2 be components of S.
If S1 ∩ S2 
= ∅, then S1 ∪ S2 ∈ F and we have that Si ⊂ S1 ∪ S2 ⊆ S for i ∈ {1, 2}.
This contradicts the fact that S1 and S2 are components of S. Conversely, assume
for any S with CF (S) 
= ∅ that its components form a partition of a subset of S.
Suppose that (N,F) does not satisfy P2. Then there are A,B ∈ F , with A ∩ B 
= ∅
and A ∪ B /∈ F . Hence there must be a component C1 ∈ CF (A ∪ B) with A ⊆ C1
and a component C2 ∈ CF (A∪B) with B ⊆ C2 such that C1 
= C2. This contradicts
the fact that the components of A ∪B are disjoint.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of players with n > 2 and we consider a subset S
of starting players. If i ∈ S, then the set {i} is feasible. Each starting player i looks
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for a player k /∈ S to generate a new feasible coalition {i, k}. These coalitions with
cardinality 2 search for new players, which agree to join one by one. If we assume
that common elements of two feasible coalitions are intermediaries between the two
coalitions in order to establish the feasibility of its union, we obtain an augmenting
system (N,F). Since the individual players k /∈ S are not feasible, the family F is
not generated by the connected subgraphs of a graph. Moreover, if players i, j ∈ S,
then {i} , {j} ∈ S and {i, j} /∈ S and hence (N,F) is not an antimatroid.
Example. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and we consider S1 = {1, 2, 4} and S2 = {1, 4}. By
using the above coalition formation model we can obtain the following augmenting
systems, represented in Figure 1.
{2, 3}
{1} {4} {1} {4}{2}
{}{}
{3, 4}{1, 2}
Fig. 1.
The sets of maximal feasible coalitions are partitions of the players into dis-
joint coalitions, that is, the coalition structures CS1 = {{1} , {4} , {2, 3}} and CS2 =
{{1, 2} , {3, 4}}. Coalition structure generation has been studied by Sandholm et al.
[14].
Example. Let us consider N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
F = {∅, {1} , {4} , {1, 2} , {3, 4} , {1, 2, 3} , {2, 3, 4} , N} .
Since {1, 2, 3} and {2, 3, 4} are feasible, property P2 implies that the grand coalition
N is a feasible set; see Figure 2.
{1, 2, 3}
{1, 2}
{1}
{}
{4}
{3, 4}
{2, 3, 4}
{1, 2, 3, 4}
Fig. 2.
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Example. The set system given by N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and
F = {∅, {1} , {4} , {1, 2} , {1, 3} , {2, 4} , {3, 4} ,
{1, 2, 3} , {1, 2, 4} , {1, 3, 4} , {2, 3, 4} , N}
is an augmenting system. Since {1, 4} /∈ F , the system (N,F) represented in Figure
3 is not an antimatroid.
{}
{1, 2}
{1, 2, 3}
{1, 2, 3, 4}
{1}
{3, 4}
{2, 3, 4}
{2, 4}
{1, 3, 4}
{1, 3}
{1, 2, 4}
{4}
Fig. 3.
3. Games restricted by augmenting systems.
Definition 3.1. Let v : 2N → R be a cooperative game and let (N,F) be an
augmenting system. The restricted game vF : 2N → R is defined by
vF (S) =
∑
T∈CF (S)
v(T ).
Remark. If (N,F) is the augmenting system given by the connected subgraphs
of a graph G = (N,E), then the game
(
N, vF
)
is a graph-restricted game which is
studied by Myerson [11] and Owen [12].
If S ∈ F , then vF (S) = v(S). Let us denote by ΓN the vector space of all
cooperative games (N, v), i.e., functions v : 2N → R such that v (∅) = 0. Ev-
ery cooperative game (N, v) is uniquely determined by the collection of its values
{v(S) : S ⊆ N, S 
= ∅}. Then ΓN will be identified with R2n−1. For any S ⊆ N, S 
=
∅, we define the unanimity game
uS(T ) =
{
1 if S ⊆ T,
0 otherwise.
Every game is a unique linear combination of unanimity games (cf. Shapley [15]),
v =
∑
S⊆N
dSuS , where dS =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S|−|T |v(T ).
We shall call dS the dividend of S in the game v. Owen [12] showed the following
property: The unanimity games uS, where S is connected in the graph G, form a
basis of the graph-restricted games.
Let (N,F) be the system of connected subgraphs of a graph G = (N,E). Hami-
ache [8] proved a formula for computing the dividends in the game vF by using the
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values in the original game v. Next, we extend Hamiache’s formula and Owen’s prop-
erty to the case when (N,F) is an augmenting system.
Proposition 3.2. Let (N,F) be an augmenting system and let (N, v) be a game.
Then the restricted game
(
N, vF
)
satisfies vF =
∑
C∈F dCuC , where the dividend
dC =
∑
{S∈F :S⊆C⊆S+}
(−1)|C|−|S|v(S)
for every nonempty C ∈ F and dC = 0 otherwise.
Proof. The game vF satisfies for every C ⊆ N
vF (C) =
∑
T⊆N
dTuT (C) =
∑
T⊆C
dT ,
where dT the dividend of T in the game v
F . Then, the Möbius inversion formula
implies (see Stanley [16]) that
dC =
∑
T⊆C
(−1)|C|−|T |vF (T ) .
It follows from vF (∅) = 0 that d∅ = 0. So we may assume that C 
= ∅. The
definition of vF implies that
dC =
∑
T⊆C
(−1)|C|−|T |

 ∑
S∈CF (T )
v(S)


=
∑
{S∈F :S⊆C}

 ∑
{T⊆C :S∈CF (T )}
(−1)|C|−|T |

 v (S) .
Let S ∈ F with S ⊆ C. We first show that
{T ⊆ C : S ∈ CF (T )} =
{
T ⊆ C : T \ S ⊆ C \ S+} .
We take T ⊆ C. If S ∈ CF (T ) , then by Proposition 2.8, S is a basis of T and
hence the set of its augmentations S∗ satisfies S∗ ∩T = ∅. Then for each i ∈ T \S we
have i ∈ C and i /∈ S ∪ S∗ = S+.
Conversely, let T ⊆ C be a set such that T \S ⊆ C \S+. Then for each i ∈ T \S
we have i /∈ S+ and hence S ∪ i /∈ F . Thus, the feasible set S is a basis of T and we
conclude that S ∈ CF (T ) .
Therefore, the coefficients of dC satisfy∑
{T⊆C :S∈CF (T )}
(−1)|C|−|T | =
∑
{T⊆C :S⊆T, T\S⊆C\S+}
(−1)|C|−|T |
= (−1)|C|−|S|

 ∑
R⊆C\S+
(−1)−|R|

 .
Next, we compute
∑
R⊆C\S+
(−1)−|R| =
∑
R⊆C\S+
(−1)|R| = (1− 1)|C\S+| =
{
1 if C \ S+ = ∅,
0 otherwise.
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Therefore, C \ S+ = ∅ ⇔ C ⊆ S+, and hence
dC =
∑
{S∈F :S⊆C, C\S+=∅}
(−1)|C|−|S|v (S)
=
∑
{S∈F :S⊆C⊆S+}
(−1)|C|−|S|v(S).
To complete the proof we observe that Proposition 2.7 implies that the set C ∈ F .
Otherwise C \ S+ 
= ∅, and so dC = 0 for all C /∈ F .
4. The Shapley and Banzhaf values. Let (N, v) be a game and let (N,F)
be an augmenting system. The Shapley value for player i in the restricted game vF
is given by
Φi
(
N, vF
)
=
∑
{S⊆N : i∈S}
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
[
vF (S)− vF (S \ i)] ,
where n = |N | and s = |S|. This value is an average of the marginal contributions
vF (S)− vF (S \ i) of a player i to all coalitions S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. In this value, the sets S
of different size get different weight. The Banzhaf value for player i in the restricted
game vF is given by
β′i
(
N, vF
)
=
∑
{S⊆N : i∈S}
1
2n−1
[
vF (S)− vF (S \ i)]
for all i ∈ N. If the number of players is n, then the function that measures the
worst case running time for computing these indices is in O (n2n) (see Deng and
Papadimitriou [4]). Moreover, to obtain the restricted game vF we need to compute
the set of the components CF (S) of every subset S ⊆ N. Then it is necessary to
consider all the feasible subsets of S, and hence the time complexity is O (t) , where
t =
n∑
s=0
(
n
s
)
2s = 3n.
The Shapley and Banzhaf values are linear mappings with respect to the charac-
teristic function, and the images of the unanimity games are, respectively (cf. Owen
[12]),
Φi (N,uS) =
{
1 /|S| if i ∈ S,
0 otherwise,
β′i (N,uS) =
{
1
/
2|S\i| if i ∈ S,
0 otherwise.
In terms of dividends dS in game v
F , we have that
Φi
(
N, vF
)
=
∑
{S⊆N : i∈S}
dS
|S| ,(1)
β′i
(
N, vF
)
=
∑
{S⊆N : i∈S}
dS
2|S\i|
.
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In the next theorem, two explicit formulas, in terms of v, for the Shapley and
Banzhaf values of the players in the restricted game vF are proved. These formulas
generalize the results obtained by Bilbao [2] for games restricted by convex geometries.
Theorem 4.1. Let (N,F) be an augmenting system and let (N, v) be a game.
Then
Φi
(
N, vF
)
=
∑
{T∈F : i∈T}
(t− 1)! t∗!
t+!
v(T )−
∑
{T∈F : i∈T∗}
t! (t∗ − 1)!
t+!
v(T ),
β′i
(
N, vF
)
=
∑
{T∈F : i∈T}
1
2t+−1
v(T )−
∑
{T∈F : i∈T∗}
1
2t+−1
v(T ),
where t = |T |, t∗ = |T ∗|, and t+ = |T+|.
Proof. By Proposition 3.2, we know that dS = 0 unless S ∈ F . We use the
formula (1) and Proposition 3.2 for computing
Φi
(
N, vF
)
=
∑
{S∈F : i∈S}
dS
|S|
=
∑
{S∈F : i∈S}
1
|S|

 ∑
{T∈F :T⊆S⊆T+}
(−1)|S|−|T |v(T )

 .
Reversing the order of summation and denoting s = |S| and t = |T |, we obtain
Φi
(
N, vF
)
=
∑
T∈F

 ∑
{S∈F : i∈S, T⊆S⊆T+}
(−1)s−t
s

 v(T )
=
∑
T∈F
ci(T )v(T ),
where
ci(T ) =
∑
{S∈F :T∪i⊆S⊆T+}
(−1)s−t
s
.
First, we suppose i ∈ T . By Proposition 2.7 the interval [T, T+] is a Boolean
algebra and hence the summation index is {S ⊆ N : T ⊆ S ⊆ T+}. Now we consider
S = T ∪R, where R = S \ T , r = |R|, and t∗ = |T ∗|. Then
ci(T ) =
∑
R⊆T∗
(−1)r
t+ r
=
t∗∑
r=0
(
t∗
r
)
(−1)r
t+ r
=
t∗∑
r=0
(
t∗
r
)
(−1)r
∫ 1
0
xt+r−1 dx
=
∫ 1
0
xt−1
t∗∑
r=0
(
t∗
r
)
(−x)r dx
=
∫ 1
0
xt−1(1− x)t∗ dx
=
(t− 1)! t∗!
t+!
.
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Next, assume that i /∈ T ; hence the index is {S ∈ F : T ∪ i ⊆ S ⊆ T+}. Then
i ∈ T+ \ T and hence i ∈ T ∗. Now the previous result yields (note that [T ∪ i, T+] is
a Boolean algebra)
ci(T ) = −
∑
{S⊆N :T∪i⊆S⊆T+}
(−1)s−(t+1)
s
= − t!(t
∗ − 1)!
t+!
.
Inserting the coefficients, we have
Φi
(
N, vF
)
=
∑
{T∈F : i∈T}
(t− 1)! t∗!
t+!
v(T )−
∑
{T∈F : i∈T∗}
(t)!(t∗ − 1)!
t+!
v(T ).(2)
The proof of the formula of the Banzhaf value is similar. The only difference is
that the coefficients are
ci(T ) =
t∗∑
r=0
(
t∗
r
)
(−1)r
(
1
2
)t+r−1
=
(
1
2
)t+−1
if i ∈ T,
ci(T ) = −
(
1
2
)t+−1
if i ∈ T ∗.
Remark. Notice that if F = 2N , then T ∗ = N \ T and T+ = N for every T ∈ F .
Thus, the formulas obtained in the above theorem are equal to the classical Shapley
and Banzhaf values for the game v. Moreover, equation (2) is equal to the equation
of Shapley [15].
Let us consider a set system (N,F). An element i of a feasible set S ∈ F is an
extreme point of S if S \ i ∈ F . The set of extreme points of S is denoted by ex(S).
The formulas for computing the Shapley and Banzhaf values of the players in the
restricted game vF can be further simplified when the player is an extreme point of
every feasible coalition. Before doing so, we will need a lemma.
Lemma 4.2. Let (N,F) be an augmenting system. If i ∈ ex(S) for all S ∈ F
which contains i with S 
= {i} , then (S \ i)+ = S+.
Proof. Note first that i ∈ (S \ i)+ and i ∈ S+. For every j ∈ (S \ i)+ with j 
= i,
we have (S \ i) ∪ j ∈ F . Then ((S \ i) ∪ j) ∩ S = S \ i 
= ∅ implies ((S \ i) ∪ j) ∪ S =
S ∪ j ∈ F and hence j ∈ S+. Conversely, for every j ∈ S+, j 
= i, we know that
S ∪ j ∈ F . Since i ∈ S ⊆ S ∪ j, the assumption implies that i ∈ ex(S ∪ j). Then
(S ∪ j) \ i = (S \ i) ∪ j ∈ F and thus j ∈ (S \ i)+.
Theorem 4.3. Let (N,F) be an augmenting system and let (N, v) be a game
such that v(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N . If i ∈ ex (S) for all S ∈ F that contains i, then
Φi
(
N, vF
)
=
∑
{S∈F : i∈S, |S|>1}
(s− 1)! s∗!
s+!
[v (S)− v(S \ i)] ,
β′i
(
N, vF
)
=
∑
{S∈F : i∈S, |S|>1}
1
2s+−1
[v(S)− v(S \ i)] ,
where s = |S|, s∗ = |S∗|, and s+ = |S+|.
Proof. We remark first that if i satisfies the hypothesis, then
{S ∈ F : i ∈ S, |S| > 1} = {S ∈ F : i ∈ ex (S) , |S| > 1} .
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Taking T = S \ i we obtain {T ∈ F : i ∈ T ∗} = {S \ i : S ∈ F , i ∈ ex (S)} . Next, we
apply Theorem 4.1 and therefore, by Lemma 4.2,
Φi
(
N, vF
)
=
∑
{S∈F : i∈S}
(s− 1)! s∗!
s+!
v(S)−
∑
{T∈F : i∈T∗}
t! (t∗ − 1)!
t+!
v(T )
=
∑
{S∈F : i∈ex(S), |S|>1}
(s− 1)! s∗!
s+!
v(S)
−
∑
{S∈F : i∈ex(S), |S|>1}
(s− 1)! s∗!
s+!
v(S \ i)
=
∑
{S∈F : i∈S, |S|>1}
(s− 1)! s∗!
s+!
[v (S)− v(S \ i)]
(note that v(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N). The result for the Banzhaf value follows
similarly.
Remark. Let (N,F) be an augmenting system that is a convex geometry. Then
for every i ∈ ex (N) we have S \ i = (N \ i) ∩ S ∈ F for all S ∈ F such that i ∈ S.
Hence, if i ∈ ex (N) , then i ∈ ex (S) for all S ∈ F with i ∈ S.
Example. Let K1,n−1 be a star on n vertices and let 1 be the center of star.
The augmenting system of the connected subgraphs of K1,n−1 is given by F =
{S ⊆ N : 1 ∈ S or |S| = 1} . Then ex(N) = {2, . . . , n} , and for all S ∈ F such
that |S| > 1, we infer that 1 ∈ S, S∗ = N \ S, and S+ = N. Moreover, the set
{S ∈ F : 1 ∈ S∗, |S| > 1} = ∅. Using these properties, the following results can be
derived from Theorems 4.1 and 4.3:
1. If (N, v) is a game such that v(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N , then
Φ1
(
N, vF
)
=
∑
{S∈F : 1∈S, |S|>1}
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
v(S).
2. If (N, v) is a game such that v(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N , then
Φi
(
N, vF
)
=
∑
{S∈F : i∈S, |S|>1}
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
[v(S)− v(S \ i)]
for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n} .
Remark. The time complexity of the direct formulas showed in Theorems 4.1 and
4.3 is polynomial in the cardinality |F| .
Example. Let us consider an augmenting system (N,F) such that the family of
its maximal elements is a coalition structure CS = {T1, . . . , Tp}. Then the number
of feasible elements is
|F| = |T1|+ · · ·+ |Tp|+ 1 = |N |+ 1,
and hence |F| is polynomial in |N |. For instance, the augmenting systems represented
in Figure 1 satisfy |F| = 5.
Example. Let (N,F) be an augmenting system with exactly two maximal chains.
Then |F| = 2 (|N | − 1)+2 = 2 |N | , and hence |F| is polynomial in |N |. For instance,
the augmenting system represented in Figure 2 satisfies |F| = 8.
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5. The potential and the MLE. The potential function for cooperative games
was defined by Hart and Mas-Colell [9]. Given a game (N, v) and a coalition S ⊆ N ,
the subgame (S, v) is obtained by restricting v to 2S . Let Γ denote the set of all
games. The potential is a function P : Γ → R which assigns to each game (N, v) a
real number P (N, v) and satisfies the following recursive equations:
P (∅, v) = 0, P (S, v) = 1|S|
[
v(S) +
∑
i∈S
P (S \ i, v)
]
for all nonempty S ⊆ N. Then themarginal contribution of i coincides with its Shapley
value P (N, v)−P (N \ i, v) = Φi (N, v) for all i ∈ N. Moreover, there are two explicit
formulas for the potential:
P (N, v) =
∑
S⊆N
dS
|S| , P (N, v) =
∑
S⊆N
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
v(S),
where s = |S| and n = |N | . The explicit formula for the potential of vF can be
obtained by a method similar to the one that is used in Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 5.1. Let (N,F) be an augmenting system and let (N, v) be a game.
Then
P
(
N, vF
)
=
∑
S∈F
(s− 1)! s∗!
s+!
v(S),
where s = |S|, s∗ = |S∗| and s+ = |S+|.
The MLE of the game (N, v) is the function of n real variables (see Owen [13])
f(v) (q1, . . . , qn) =
∑
S⊆N
∏
j∈S qj dS , where dS is the dividend of S in the game
(N, v). Owen showed that
Φi(N, v) =
∫ 1
0
∂f(v)
∂qi
(t, . . . , t) dt,
β′i(N, v) =
∂f(v)
∂qi
(
1
2
, . . . ,
1
2
)
.
Proposition 5.2. Let (N,F) be an augmenting system and let (N, v) be a game.
Then the MLE of vF is given by
f
(
vF
)
(q1, . . . , qn) =
∑
S∈F
∏
j∈S
qj

 ∑
{T∈F :T⊆S⊆T+}
(−1)|S|−|T |v(T )

 .
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on antimatroids, Center discussion paper 124, Tilburg University, The Netherlands, 2000;
Discrete Math., submitted.
[2] J. M. Bilbao, Values and potential of games with cooperation structure, Internat. J. Game
Theory, 27 (1998), pp. 131–145.
[3] P. Borm, G. Owen, and S. Tijs, On the position value for communication situations, SIAM
J. Discrete Math., 5 (1992), pp. 305–320.
[4] X. Deng and C. H. Papadimitriou, On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts, Math.
Oper. Res., 19 (1994), pp. 257–266.
COOPERATIVE GAMES UNDER AUGMENTING SYSTEMS 133
[5] R. P. Dilworth, Lattices with unique irreducible decompositions, Ann. Math., 41 (1940), pp.
771–777.
[6] P. H. Edelman and R. E. Jamison, The theory of convex geometries, Geom. Dedicata, 19
(1985), pp. 247–270.
[7] R. P. Gilles, G. Owen, and R. van den Brink, Games with permission structures: The
conjunctive approach, Internat. J. Game Theory, 20 (1992), pp. 277–293.
[8] G. Hamiache, A value with incomplete communication, Games Economic Behav., 26 (1999),
pp. 59–78.
[9] S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, The potential of the Shapley value, in The Shapley Value:
Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK 1988,
pp. 127–137.
[10] B. Korte, L. Lovász, and R. Schrader, Greedoids, Springer, Berlin, 1991.
[11] R. B. Myerson, Graphs and cooperation in games, Math. Oper. Res., 2 (1977), pp. 225–229.
[12] G. Owen, Values of graph-restricted games, SIAM J. Algebraic Discrete Methods, 7 (1986),
pp. 210–220.
[13] G. Owen, Multilinear extension of games, in The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S.
Shapley, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK 1988, pp. 139–151.
[14] T. Sandholm, K. Larson, M. Andersson, O. Shehory, and F. Tohmé, Coalition structure
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